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INTRODUCTION
The National Performance Review (NPR) Report is a wide-
ranging document that incorporates numerous proposals to stream-
line government and improve its efficiency.' A portion of the
report addresses regulatory reform, and Improving Regulatory
Systems, an accompanying document, focuses solely on this topic.2
Most of the regulatory reform proposals have been discussed in
the administrative law and policy community for several years.
The influence of the Administrative Conference and the Carnegie
Commission is evident
Some recommendations are designed to improve the efficiency
of public regulation. Incentive-based systems, for example, can
make government policies more cost-effective. Other recommenda-
tions are disembodied law reforms, espoused without much con-
cern for the substantive problems to which they might apply. This
Comment contrasts one of these recommendations-regulatory
negotiation-with incentive-based proposals. I wish to demonstrate
that regulatory negotiation (reg neg) has been oversold as a re-
form and to argue that incentive-based systems, which obviate the
need for certain types of rulemaking, deserve greater emphasis.
Improving Regulatory Systems recommends increased use of both
I Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University. This Comment is based on remarks presented at a symposium on the Nation-
al Performance Review held at Duke University School of Law on January 20, 1994.
1. See AL GORE, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERN-
MENT THAT WORKS BETrER & COSTS LESS (1993).
2. See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATION-
AL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS [hereinafter IMPROVING
REGULATORY SYSTEMS].
3. See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECH., & GOV'T, RISK AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993) (making many of the same
proposals as Improving Regulatory Systems).
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negotiation4 and incentives5 but does not address their interrela-
tionship.
I. REGULATION VERSUS REGULATIONS
There is a difficulty with the concept of regulation that arises
from the interdisciplinary nature of regulatory reform. Lawyers
and economists often define "regulation" in contrasting terms
without recognizing the distinction. To lawyers, regulations stand
in contrast to statutes. A statute sets the basic framework under
which the agency interprets the congressional mandate by issuing
regulations and other policymaking and implementation docu-
ments. Any kind of substantive statute may require the issuance of
regulations before it can be implemented. The Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Health and Human Services,
not usually thought of as "regulatory agencies," are among the
most prolific issuers of regulations.6 A national health insurance
system, if established, would require a multitude of regulations to
implement it.
In contrast, to economists, regulation is a type of public policy
that involves little public spending but instead aims to control and
direct private economic activity. Regulation is used to control
externalities, overcome information deficits, or limit monopolistic
inefficiencies. A regulatory statute in the economist's sense may
require the executive to issue regulations, but it need not. Eco-
nomic regulation also may be accomplished through a series of
adjudications or lawsuits without the executive issuing "regula-
tions."
In assessing the NPR proposals, it is important to keep in
mind this distinction between economic regulation and legal regu-
lations.' Some proposals, such as those advocating more incentive-
4. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 32.
5. See id. at 72.
6. 1990-1991 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 652, app. IV (listing by agency the
number of final rule documents published in the Federal Register from 1982 to 1989).
7. Presidential oversight of the regulatory process suffers from some of this same
confusion of terminology. For example, President Clinton's executive order of September
30, 1993, on regulatory planning and review, includes both senses of the term. The
"[s]ignificant regulatory action" to be reviewed by the White House includes both regula-
tions having an impact of at least $100 million on the economy and those that
"[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan pro-
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based policies and better risk assessment techniques, fall into the
economist's box. The key feature of such proposals is their depen-
dence on substantive policy problems. Other proposals, intended
to streamline rulemaking procedures and enhance public participa-
tion, do not directly relate to substantive regulatory concerns. One
problem with the NPR Report is its failure to acknowledge these
distinct meanings of "regulation" or to confront the tension be-
tween them. The remainder of this Comment attempts to do just
that for regulatory negotiation and incentive schemes.
II. REGULATORY NEGOTIATION
The American regulatory process is commonly criticized for
being too confrontational and legalistic. Commentators have there-
fore urged more cooperation and dialogue and have recommended
the use of participatory, consensual procedures. In response to
these calls, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 19908 establishes
procedures that can be used prior to beginning a rulemaking pro-
ceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9 The
goal is to streamline the rulemaking process and reduce the incen-
tive to challenge the final rule in court by the negotiation of draft
rules to which all interested parties agree.
Unfortunately, negotiation under regulatory statutes may be
difficult if these statutes alter expectations and entitlements. Ex-
cept under an extreme interpretation of the Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution," statutes can legitimately shift the expectations
of regulated entities and beneficiaries. Such a shift creates no
special problems for regulatory negotiation if the language of the
statute is clear. If it is not, however, entitlements cannot be nego-
tiated. If the parties are left to clarify the basic entitlement struc-
ture of the statute, a negotiation will be unsuccessful because an
entitlement gain to one party represents a loss to another. Thus.
the regulatory agency must interpret ambiguous terms that deter-
grams or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (1993).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. IV 1992).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
10. See. e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that virtually all taxes, regulations. and changes in
the common law rules of tort, property, and contracts constitute takings); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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mine the basic structure of property rights before a negotiation
can proceed.
One way to encourage agreement is for the agency to an-
nounce what it will decide if the negotiation fails." Then each
party knows how it would fare in the absence of an agreement.
The parties' knowledge of each other's expectations would influ-
ence their bargaining positions. This limitation of the bargaining
range facilitates agreement by clarifying and making credible the
parties' claims concerning the consequences of failing to reach
agreement. If the negotiation process itself is supposed to elicit
information about the costs and benefits of various options, how-
ever, then the agency may be unable to specify its fallback posi-
tion with precision. Negotiation is not effective -when technical
information is needed to resolve factual disputes.12
In general, the agency must restrict the range of choices so
that mutually beneficial options consistent with the statute are
available. Programs designed to redistribute wealth are poor candi-
dates for cooperative procedures. Similarly, programs that touch
on the fundamental values of negotiators are unlikely to produce a
consensus. 3 Imagine, for example, the Catholic church and a pro-
choice organization seeking to negotiate federal policy on abor-
tion.
A regulatory negotiation is not analogous to a therapy session
or a friendly, disinterested discussion of policy options. It is similar
to a contract negotiation in which all parties expect to gain from
an agreement but where the gains can be divided up in different
11. Improving Regulatory Systems states that the participants must believe that the
agency will issue a rule if consensus is not reached. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYS-
TEMS. supra note 2. at 31. Even if met, this condition does not encourage negotiation
unless all parties believe that agreement is better than failing to agree. If the agency is
expected to issue a rule strongly favoring one interest, that interest has little incentive to
compromise. Conversely, uncertainty about the content of the rule could facilitate agree-
ment if each party is pessimistic about its ability to prevail in a conventional rulemaking.
12. For example, negotiation of rules for disinfectants and disinfection byproducts in
drinking water was stymied by the lack of scientific data. The negotiation concluded with
the participants calling for more research. Disinfectant, Byproduct Negotiation Process
Leaves Scientific Gaps, Advisory Board Says, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1201 (Oct. 29,
1993).
13. For example, the chief of the consensus and dispute resolution staff at the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1991 reported that environmental groups declined
to negotiate on policies concerning radioactive waste because they feared that any agree-
ment would anger their constituents. Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Agencies Use Negotiations to
Pre-empt Lawsuits over Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al, B10.
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ways. Because of its focus on strategic interaction between the
parties, game theory is the appropriate analytic tool for studying
reg negs. Although psychological studies of small group bargaining
also can help one understand how agreements are reached, the
psychological forces at work may have as much to do with power
and strength as with trust and mutual respect. The proponents of
reg neg should not forget that the parties are bargaining under
conditions in which their interests are, in part, opposed. 4
Depending on the issues subject to negotiation, the agency or
an independent "convener" under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
must determine the ground rules for the negotiation. The most
important issue is selecting participants. All the interest groups
participating must be well organized' and similar in knowledge and
bargaining skill. There also must not be too many distinct
groups." For labor-management issues in the unionized sector,
this problem is not of central importance, although, even there,
the ability of managers to represent shareholders may be ques-
tioned, and union leaders are not always good spokesmen for the
rank and file. Only about 15% of the workforce is unionized,
however, 6 and many regulatory issues do not have such a simple
structure of interests. In negotiations about environmental pollu-
tion, for example, the diverse, geographically scattered individuals
who breathe the air and drink the water cannot always be repre-
sented effectively by standard environmental groups. These knowl-
edgeable and ideologically committed groups must be heard by the
bureaucracy, but they do not necessarily speak for ordinary citi-
zens. In sum, a central role for regulatory negotiation in environ-
mental policymaking seems ill-advised simply because the notion
of interest representation on which the method is based does not
apply to most environmental issues.
If, however, the representation problem can be solved, the
convener must determine the number and identity of the partici-
14. When returning from the Duke symposium, I came across an advertisement in
the in-flight magazine that reflects this view of negotiation: "In business, you don't get
what you deserve, you get what you negotiate."
15. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 3 (suggesting 20 to 25
as the maximum feasible number). The regulatory negotiation statute sets 25 as the limit
on membership unless the agency argues otherwise. See 5 U.S.C. § 565(b).
16. In 1989, only 16% of nonagricultural workers were unionized; 12% of all workers
in the private sector were unionized. Richard B. Freeman, How Mtch Has De-Unioniza-
tion Contributed to the Rise in Male Earnings Inequality?, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 133, 137 (Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993).
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pants and other features of the negotiation environment. The
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 resolves many of these is-
sues,17 but, in general, there are a range of alternative structures.
Many of these details are essential to achieving a viable negotiat-
ing structure, but I do not analyze them here. Instead, I have
focused on the more fundamental limits of the process. First, regu-
latory negotiation does not help parties acquire technical or scien-
tific information. Its main value is in clarifying the interests at
stake and helping disparate interests find common ground. Second,
regulatory negotiation cannot succeed unless basic entitlements are
clear and participants can predict what actions the agency will
take if no agreement is reached. Solutions must exist that are
mutually beneficial given the entitlement structure. Regulation
must not require the compromise of any participant's fundamental
values. Third, regulatory negotiation is not democratically legiti-
mate unless all interested parties are adequately represented.
Agreement among only the subset of interests that have organized
advocates is not sufficient.
According to Improving Regulatory Systems, the aims of regu-
latory negotiation are to reduce the time it takes to put a rule
into effect and to obtain high levels of compliance. t8 Because
affected parties have signed on to the negotiated regulation, they
may be both less likely to challenge the rule in court and more
likely to comply with it. However, as the authors of the report
recognize, regulatory negotiation under current law introduces an
extra step that is time-consuming and difficult. One observer ad-
vised participants to expect a "roller coaster experience."'" Even
though regulatory negotiation may shorten the regulatory process
in terms of calendar time, 0 the actual hours of participant time
17. For example, the convener "ascertain[s] the names of persons who are willing
and qualified to represent interests that will be significantly affected by the proposed
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(2). Other aspects of the process are specified in 5 U.S.C. §§
564-567.
18. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra not6 2. at 30.
19. Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647, 10,654 (Oct. 1992).
20. Evidence is weak that regulatory negotiation reduces the elapsed time between
the beginning and the end of the regulatory process. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS,
supra note 2, at 32 n.8 (finding that four regulatory negotiations at EPA took less time
on the average than conventional rulemakings) (citing Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R.
Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 124 (1992)). As the authors of the NPR Report recognize, however, the Kerwin
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may be greater than under other regulatory procedures.2 Al-
though a number of regulatory negotiations have been success-
ful,' the claims of widespread benefits are mostly speculative.
And when it comes to enforcing the regulation, reg neg may not
help significantly; even for rules promulgated by standard methods,
compliance seems high.'
III. INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
Incentive systems operate on a very different model from
regulatory negotiation. Rather than seeking a consensus of those
receiving the benefits and bearing the costs of the regulation, the
government adopts a clear goal, be it improving the efficiency or
the equity of the economy. The detailed allocation of regulatory
responsibilities is, however, not determined centrally. Rather, the
government pursues a decentralized implementation plan to reduce
the detail and volume of regulations required. Regulated entities
operate in an arm's length market relationship. Organized public
interest groups can also participate. In a tradable rights system for
environmental protection, for example, those who favor strong
controls on pollution discharges can purchase rights in the market.
They do not need to obtain the explicit consent of the regulated
firms.24
and Furlong study did not control for the complexity or controversy of the rules in-
volved. Id. Perhaps the numbers indicate simply that the EPA has done a good job of
selecting manageable topics for reg neg.
21. See Siegler, supra note 19, at 10,651-52.
22. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS. supra note 2, at 29 (reporting that approxi-
mately 35 federal negotiated rulemakings have taken place or are underway, with almost
half at the EPA).
23. A study of compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
standards by the custom woodworking industry found high levels of compliance despite
weak agency enforcement. David Weil, If OSHA Is So Bad Why Is Compliance So
Good? 13-35 (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Boston University).
24. For a general discussion of incentive systems, see THOMAS H. TIETENBERG,
EMISSIONS TRADING, AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985) [herein-
after TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING] (analyzing the benefits and cost savings created
by discharge permit trading programs); Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for
Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. 'ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1989, at 95 (discussing the theoretical implications and actual results of the
establishment of marketable permits and emissions charges programs); Thomas H.
Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation. in ECONOMIC POLICY
TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 86 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991) [hereinafter Tietenberg, Eco-
nomic Instruments] (discussing emissions trading and emissions charges).
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Improving Regulatory Systems accepts the basic arguments
favoring market-like systems.' Similarly, President Clinton's exec-
utive order on regulatory review urges regulators to use incentive-
based systems when feasible.26 Incentive-based regulatory systems
have long been recommended by economists and policy analysts as
ways to improve the efficiency of both regulatory and subsidy
programs. Such proposals play a major role in policy debates on
issues for which outright deregulation and privatization are not
feasible options. Market-like systems can help accomplish the goal
of cost-effective regulation by moving away from the traditional
regulatory scheme of uniform standards with exceptions for politi-
cally influential groups. A few libertarians deny the need for any
public regulation, but even many conservatives accept a role for
the government in correcting market failures.' Although work-
able systems may be difficult to design in an environment of cau-
tious bureaucrats and conflicting political pressures, the possible
savings from effective programs are significant.29
25. The second recommendation of the report is "Encourage More Innovative Ap-
proaches to Regulation," a category that includes "using market-oriented approaches."
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 24. The report simply lists the use
of marketable permits and monetary incentives as two such approaches. See id. There is
no analysis beyond the recitation of a few examples such as the acid rain trading pro-
gram and the sale of airport landing slots. See id. at 25. The actual recommendations are
fairly modest, including a deskbook on regulatory design and the establishment of "inno-
vative approaches" as agency policy. Id. at 26-27.
26. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (1993) ("Each agency
shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing
economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.").
27. For applications in the environmental area, see TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRAD-
ING, supra note 24; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives. 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988);
Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 675-740 (1992); Hahn, supra note 24; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Pro-
gram, 6 YALE J. REG. 109 (1989); Tietenberg, Economic Instruments. supra note 24. On
social welfare programs, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Social Services: Proxy Shopping, in
RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATO-
RY STATE 97 (1992).
28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-379 (4th ed.
1992) (rather grudgingly recognizing the benefits of direct regulation over the common
law in some circumstances).
29. For a study demonstrating these savings in the environmental area, see
TIETENBIt-RG, EMISSIONS TRADING. supra note 24, at 38-58.
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But incentive-based systems must be designed with care if
they are to be successful. Efficiency is not guaranteed just because
a market-like scheme has been established. The statutory, bureau-
cratic, and political difficulties of implementing the sulphur dioxide
rights trading program under the 1990 amendments to the Clean
Air Act30 suggest the problems of incentive-based systems. The
program is a major legislative innovation, but its impact may be
modest. The statute limits the reach of the trading system so that
the efficiency benefits do not extend to all discharges. It treats
discharges the same independent of geographical location when, in
fact, the marginal damage caused by discharges in the Middle
West far exceeds that of discharges in the Northeast. To avoid
Takings Clause challenges, the Act explicitly states that the dis-
charge permits are not property rights, thus discouraging public
utilities from treating them as such.31 The implementation of the
trading program in the regulated electrical utility industry also
depends on whether state utility commissions treat rights as capital
assets in rate-setting proceedings.32 The RECLAIM system for air
pollution in the Los Angeles region appears to have coped with
some of these practical problems of program design, but it too will
face implementation and start-up difficulties.33 These difficulties,
however, reflect not fundamental flaws in the regulatory concept
but the growing pains that are inevitable when an innovative idea
is put into practice. The benefits of incentive-based schemes
should not be denigrated simply because implementation requires
careful planning.
Rather than reiterate the well-known efficiency benefits of
incentive-based schemes, however, I want to emphasize their po-
tential impact on the administrative process. Incentive systems can
30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 411-413, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651j-76511 (Supp.
IV 1992).
31. Id. § 403, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f).
32. For commentaries on implementation of the system, see Douglas R. Bohi &
Dallas Burtraw. Avoiding Regulatory Gridlock in the Acid Rain Program, 10 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 676 (1991); Karl Hausker, The Politics and Economics of Auction
Design in the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Pollution, 11 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 553
(1992).
33. RECLAIM stands for the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market of California's
South Coast Air Quality Management District. For an overview of the practical problems
of designing a workable system of tradable rights, see Dale A. Carlson & Anne M.
Sholtz, RECLAIM: Lessons from Southern California for Environmental Markets, J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAc., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 15-26.
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reduce the need for rulemaking and redirect its focus. As a re-
sponse to the difficulties of APA rulemaking, such systems are an
alternative to 'regulatory negotiation. Rather than seeking consen-
sus, a market system permits the decentralized, independent choic-
es of individuals and businesses to shape policy outcomes within
the constraints of the law. Like reg negs, incentive systems are
based on voluntary choices, but the choices are made in response
to relative prices, not negotiation dynamics. Regulated entities
decide on their own what to do given the market-like constraints
imposed by the public program.
Because an incentive-based regulatory structure depends on
individual choice, it shares many of the efficiency features of pri-
vate markets, such as -superior information processing. In a com-
petitive market individuals need know only market prices and
their own tastes and endowments. They need know nothing about
other people's tastes and endowments or about the production
methods and profits of producers. Similarly, producers need know
only their own production methods and the prices of inputs and
outputs. The price system allocates goods efficiently without any-
one having a comprehensive overview of the entire system. This
characteristic of the market makes it applicable to'statutes that
seek to improve the efficiency of the economy. If the bureaucracy
can determine the marginal benefits of controlling an externality,
it can set a fee equal to this marginal benefit and let the produc-
ers respond. The bureaucracy would carry out a rulemaking de-
signed to increase information about benefits. If marginal benefits
vary depending on the level of the externality, the agency also
would need aggregate data on costs to set the price or determine
the number of tradable rights. The data would not need to be
gathered at individual plants but could be an industrywide esti-
mate.3 4
Even when the goal is distributive, such as in federal housing
programs, vouchers or similar devices such as "proxy shopping"
may inject some of the efficiency benefits of the market into gov-
ernment social programs.35 The government would still need to
set eligibility standards, monitor voucher use, and set the overall
level of public spending. With a voucher plan, because beneficia-
34. For articles discussing the benefits of an incentive-based regulatory scheme, see
supra notes 24, 27.
35. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 27, at 97-100.
12151994]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ries would not be using their own funds to purchase the benefit,
the government might be required to set minimum quality stan-
dards. However, detailed regulation of quality might be avoided,
along with the complex and time-consuming processes it entails.
IV. CONSENSUS VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION
How should policymakers decide which approach to regulation
is best given our commitment both to public participation and to
technical competence and efficiency? The initial consideration is a
constitutional one. Because both regulatory negotiation and incen-
tive systems involve private individuals, they raise concerns about
the extent to which the government can delegate public tasks to
the private sector. American democracy traditionally is wary of
delegating policymaking tasks to private groups. In A.L.A. Schech-
ter Poultry Corp. v. United States,36 the U.S. Supreme Court ob-
jected to Congress's reliance on industry self-regulation.
The Government urges that the codes will "consist of rules of
competition deemed fair for each industry by representative
members of that industry-by the persons most vitally concerned
and most familiar with its 'problems."..... But would it be seri-
ously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative au-
thority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to em-
power them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and benefi-
cent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or indus-
tries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be con-
stituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associa-
tions or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterpris-
es? ... The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative
power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the
constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.37
More recently, the Administrative Conference has recommended
procedural guidelines for private technical groups to follow when
their standards influence federal policymaking.38 The procedures
are similar to the APA informal rulemaking process.39 Further-
36. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37. Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
38. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-4 (1993) (Recommendation No. 78-4: federal agency inter-
action with private standard-setting organizations in the area of health and safety regula-
tion).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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more, without examining the procedures used by the private orga-
nization, a federal appeals court refused to uphold an Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act rulemaking for 428 toxic substances that
relied on the standards of the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).4" The ACGIH standards
at least can be justified by the expertise of committee members,
even if accountable procedures were not followed. Regulatory
negotiations by private groups cannot be so justified. Their defense
is based on politics, not technical competence. Unless structured
carefully, they may run afoul of the language in Schecter Poul-
try .
41
To avoid this difficulty, the new regulatory negotiation statute
establishes a process that can be used only before the standard
rulemaking procedure begins.42 The aim of the Act is to make
the rulemaking process less time-consuming and adversarial and
reduce the need for judicial review,43 but as an added-on proce-
dure it cannot fulfill all the goals of its advocates. The American
commitment to democratic accountability, even within the 'bu-
reaucracy, and our distrust of corporatist methods will keep the
scope of regulatory negotiation limited.
In contrast, there are no such fundamental limits to the appli-
cability of incentive schemes. In a recent constitutional challenge
to administratively set fees, the Supreme Court held that user fees
do not have the same constitutional status as taxes.' Thus, the
level of fees can be set by the bureaucracy rather than by Con-
gress.45 Pricing systems appear to be consistent with American
democratic values. User fees for public facilities such as parks and
museums are an accepted feature of American life. The same
principle would justify similar fees for using scarce public goods
such as air and water.
At present, discussions of regulatory reform conflate the inef-
ficient design of statutory schemes with issues of property entitle-
40. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 984-85 (11th Cir. 1992).
41. See supra text accompanying note 37.
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (stating that the negotiation process is to be consistent with 5
U.S.C. § 553).
43. See id. § 561 note.
44. Skinner v. Mid-Atlantic Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214 (1989) (holding that user
fees could be set by an administrative agency). The Court stated that the taxation provi-
sions of the Constitution do not require that such fees be set by Congress. Id. at 220-23.
45. Id.
12171994]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ments. Constitutional law debates over "regulatory takings" over-
lap with the regulatory reform agenda. Yet moving to a more
efficient pricing system for scarce resources does not imply any-
thing about the appropriate distribution of property rights. Issues
of property entitlements should be addressed separately. Often,
however, they are not. For example, supporters of the tradable
rights provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act managed to mute
opposition from utility companies by giving them rights proportion-
al to past discharges. This action had little to recommend it on
equity grounds, but it did help the program to pass.4 6 Similarly,
opposition to setting efficient prices for the use of resources
owned by the government, such as water, minerals, timber, and
pastureland, is grounded not so much on the efficiency gains of
higher prices, as on the losses in income that those who benefit
from low prices will suffer.47
Within the constraints imposed by the Constitution, the choice
between regulatory negotiation and incentive systems should de-
pend on the nature of the regulatory task. Regulatory negotiation
is premised on the idea that the state is searching, not for the
ideal answer, but for a solution to which everyone can agree. In
contrast, cost-benefit analysis, the analytic technique behind
market-like solutions, is predicated on a particular way of aggre-
46. Allocation of rights on the basis of past discharges is provided for in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651b-7651f. For a discussion of the politics of this issue, see GARY C. BRYNER.
BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR AcT OF 1990 at 144-47 (1993); Clean
Air Bill Launches a New Era for Utility Power Supply Planners, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK.,
Oct. 29, 1990. at 1.
47. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt's aspirations in this area are expressed in
Remarks by Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt to the National Press Club, Apr. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires file (outlining his plans to institute market-like
pricing systems in the western United States for hardrock minerals, livestock grazing, and
water). For a sample of articles discussing the politics of these issues, see Catalina
Camia, Clinton's Forest Compromise Is Assailed From All Sides, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 1726 (1993); Catalina Camia, Severity of Job Loss at Issue in Mining Law Overhaul.
52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 18 (1994); Andrew Taylor, President Will Not Use Budget to
Rewrite Land-Use Laws, 51 CONG. Q. VKLY. REP. 833 (1993).
The administration's most recent proposal for livestock grazing would approximately
double fees on public land by 1997 in the context of an incentive-based system. See 59
Fed. Reg. 14,314 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780 and 4100) (proposed Mar. 25,
1994) (substantially revising 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208 (1993)). For criticisms and an overview
of the Clinton plan to raise grazing fees, see John H. Cushman Jr., Administration Offers
Plan to Raise Fees for Ranchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at B6, and Catalina Camia,
Democrats Lash Out at Babbitt Over Revised Grazing Plan, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
598 (1994).
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gating preferences that may not obtain unanimous consent. The
technique does not always give clear-cut answers when value con-
flicts are central. Regulatory negotiation, however, also is unsuit-
able for such policy conflicts. Focused discussions with citizens to
learn their preferences may be worthwhile, but that is a very dif-
ferent model of public involvement from the negotiated resolution
of policy conflicts.'
Of course, regulatory negotiation and incentive systems need
not be mutually exclusive alternatives; they could be complements.
For example, the regulations that are needed under a market
scheme could be produced by consensual methods. However, the
commitment to least cost solutions, which is a precondition for
incentive-based systems, would rule out some of the political com-
promises that might arise under regulatory negotiation. The regula-
tory issues in the design of incentive schemes are usually technical
and informational-not the kind of bureaucratic problems that can
be solved by negotiation.
Negotiated solutions may be more valuable outside the rule-
making context when the government must resolve individual
disputes. The term "Alternative Dislute Resolution" (ADR) is
often used to contrast the method, not with APA rulemaking, but
with use of the courts. Improving Regulatory Systems recommends
increased use of the 1990 ADR statute.49 Negotiations might help
increase understanding among those affected by some public deci-
sions; such as the siting of hazardous facilities. Even here, howev-
er, understanding may not be sufficient to effect a solution. The
zero-sum nature of some siting decisions makes agreement diffi-
cult. In such situations, bargaining may be ineffective. Instead, per-
mitting localities to bid for harms may help increase the range of
possibilities by providing compensation to those willing to endure
potentially harmful sites. A zero-sum choice would be converted to
a mutually acceptable one. Consensus is reached by restructuring
the incentives, not by discussing differences.
In short, given the limitations of regulatory negotiation, struc-
tural incentive-based reform seems a more promising way to avoid
the pitfalls of the rulemaking process without sacrificing either
48. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 36-37 (recommending
policy discussion groups, public meetings, and focus groups).
49. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 2, at 47-52 (discussing the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (Supp. IV 1992)).
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technical competence or the value of participation. Although nei-
ther system can resolve value conflicts, incentive-based systems can
sometimes be structured to avoid them. The participants need not
agree with one another. Instead, they all react to a common set of
market-like incentives. Such processes may, like the market itself,
conserve information and reduce the need for detailed regulations.
Of course, incentive systems are not a solution to all of the pa-
thologies of the modem regulatory state. They are a method of
implementing statutory goals. If the statutes are themselves inco-
herent, inconsistent, or overly costly, no administrative reform can
correct these failings. Incentive systems are a means of achieving
cost-effectiveness and reducing the regulation-writing burden. They
can be designed to serve a wide range of public ends, but they are
not a method by which basic principles of public life can be debat-
ed and resolved. Debates over fundamentals should occur within
the political framework of legislative deliberations or open agency
hearings.
Improving Regulatory Systems is a useful first step toward
reform of the regulatory process. It was prepared under time pres-
sure by a small White House staff. As such, it does little more
than summarize and categorize a wide range of proposals. The
next step is to develop some of the report's suggestions into oper-
ational proposals. In doing so, reformers must provide a more
comprehensive framework for regulatory reform than that of Im-
proving Regulatory Systems. This Comment, contrasting regulatory
negotiation with incentive systems, is a first preliminary step in
that direction. It should be followed by a broad-gauged effort
within the administration by those concerned with "reinventing
government."
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